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UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION-DIS-
QUALIFICATION CLAUSE-THE RIGHT TO 
UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS FOR LOSS OF ONE 
JOB WHILE ON STRIKE FROM ANOTHER JOB 
Plaintiff brought an action to review the decision of the State of 
Utah's Department of Employment Security that he did not qualify to 
receive unemployment compensation benefits.! Plaintiff was employed as a 
heavy equipment operator with Kennecott Copper (hereafter Kennecott) 
since 1955, and as a bulldozer operator for Pioneer Sand and Gravel 
(hereafter Pioneer) since 1966, working both jobs on a full time basis since 
April 20, 1967. Both jobs paid approximately the same hourly wage, but 
Pioneer did not provide the fringe benefits' incident to plaintiff's 
employment with Kennecott. 
On July 15, 1967, a strike by the United Steel Workers resulted in a 
work stoppage at Kennecott and plaintiff refused to cross the picket lines. 
During the eight months he was absent from Kennecott due to the labor 
dispute, he neither resigned nor lost seniority benefits. During the existence 
of the strike at Kennecott plaintiff maintained a full time position with 
Pioneer until December 20, 1967, when he was laid off due to inclement 
weather. Plaintiffs application for unemployment compensation for the 
period he was unemployed between the layoff at Pioneer and the 
termination of the work stoppage at Kennecott was denied. The 
Department of Employment Security ruled that his unemployment status 
was due to a work stoppage by a strike. On appeal to the Supreme Court 
of Utah, held, affirmed. When a strike at one of two employers temporarily 
stops work, a layoff by the second employer because of inclement weather 
does not entitle the employee to unemployment compensation for loss of 
the second job during the strike that he was out of work from the second 
employment. Cruz v. Department of Employment Security, 22 Utah 2d 
393,453 P. 2d 894 (1969). 
State unemployment compensation acts were adopted in response to a 
comprehensive federal-state social insurance program initiated by the Social 
Security Act of 1935.2 The federal Act was an attempt, in part, to alleviate 
I. The court based it's decision on UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-4-5(c) (1953): "An individual 
shall be ineligible for benefits .•. (d) For any week in which it is found by the commission 
that his unemployment is due to a stoppage of work which exists because of a strike involving 
his grade, class or group of workers at the factory or establishment at which he is or was 
last employed." 
2. See, e.g .. Haggart, Unemployment Compensation During Labor Disputes, 37 NEB. L 
REV. 668, 695 (1958). 
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the widespread hardships caused by the depression of the 1930's.3 The 
draftsmen of the Act recognized the need to stabilize the effects of the 
business cycle on unemployment.4 The states responded to the federal 
government's example by enacting their own unemployment insurance 
legislation.s The state programs varied in degree of similarity with the 
federal Act,6 but due to the impetus of Title III and Title IX,7 every state 
included a disqualifying provision in regard to labor disputes.s 
There are two general categories of labor dispute disqualification 
provisions.9 The most common type is based upon the Draft 
Unemployment Insurance bills drawn by the Social Security Board in 1936 
and 1937 for the advice and assistance of state legislators.lo Basically, the 
provisions lay down a general rule of disqualification from compensation 
3. H.R. Doc. No. 81, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1935); see, e.g., T. BRODEN, LAw OF 
SOCIAL SECURITY AND UNEMPLOYMENT INSURA)..CE (1962). The experience of a social 
insurance legislation in other countries also had a marked influence on the development of an 
American system. H.R. REp. No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 16-17 (1935). For a history of 
the development of unemployment compensation in the United States, see Witte, Development 
of Unemployment Compensation, 55 YALE L.J. 21 (1945). 
4. See, e.g., Haggart, supra note 2, at 672; Riesenfeld, The Place of Unemployment 
Insurance Within The Patterns And Policies of Protection Against Wage-Loss, 8 VAND. L. 
REv. 218, 243 (1955): "Unemployment Insurance ... is ... mainly thought of as a second 
line of defense, and its chief permanent function is to bridge the gap caused by frictional and 
other transitional unemployment." The supporters of unemployment compensation were not 
in complete agreement as to the ultimate objectives of the program. Burns, Unemployment 
Compensation and Socio-Economic Objectives, 55 YALE L.J. 1,7 (1945): 
[P)roponents of unemployment insurance were sharply divided into two camps: 
those who held that the major purpose was to encourage employers to stabilize 
employment ... and those who held that the primary purpose was the payment of 
benefits to unemployed workers. 
5. Wisconsin was the only state to experiment in unemployment legislation prior to 1935, 
but within two years of the passage of the federal Act, every state had unemployment 
insurance laws. 
6. See, e.g., Burns, supra note 4, at 2: "[F)rom the very first the laws of the inriivjl\uJI 
states have reflected different purposes and have therefore been characterized by different 
provisions. . . ." 
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 501-03 (1964) was a federal grant of administration funds. 26 id. 
§ 3304 (1964) provided a tax advantage to employers. In order to take advantage of these 
provisions the state acts had to meet certain requirements approved by the Secretary of Labor. 
8. For a general breakdown of similarities and differences among state disqualification 
provisions see Lewis, The Law of Unemployment Compensation in Labor Disputes, 13 LAB. 
L.J. 174 (1962). 
9. See, e.g., T.-BRODEN, supra note 3, at 357. 
10. The draft bill, in turn, was modeled after the British Unemployment Insurance Act 
of 1935. This type has been adopted by 36 states, including Utah. The other type of labor 
dispute provision is based on the Wisconsin Unemployment Compensation Act and 
disqualifies employees who are idled by a labor dispute regardless of the degree of involvement 
or the merit ofthe dispute. See T. BRODEN, supra note 3, at 357-59 •. 
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followed by certain exceptions or escape clauses. The general exclusion 
from benefits depends on a "work stoppage"l1 due to a labor disputeP 
Unemployment caused by such an event at a factory or establishmentl3 
where the claimant is or was last employed di~qualifies him from benefits. 
If the particular claimant can show he ,vas not participating in,14 
financing,IG was not of the same grade or class of the striking workers,16 
or was not directly interested in the labor dispute,17 he can escape 
disqualification.ls 
There are three basic arguments upon which the disqualification of 
benefits to unemployed workers during labor disputes is justified. The first 
is an adoption of the SoCial Security Board's Draft Bill phrase that benefits 
were to be provided for persons who become unemployed "through no fault 
of their own. "19 The argument is that the. purpose of granting 
unemployment compensation is to protect workers against involuntary 
unemployment. Thus, since striking employees are not out of work against 
their will they should not be granted benefits.20 The second argument is that 
II. For cases relating to what constitutes a work-stoppage, see Sakrison v. Pierce, 66 
Ariz. 162, 185 P.2d 528 (1947); Robert S. Abbott Pub. Co. v. Annunzio, 414 Ill. 559, 112 
N.E.2d 101 (1953); Lawrence Baking Co. v. Michigan Unemployment Compensation 
Comm'n,308 Mich. 198, 13 N. W.2d 260 (1944). 
12. For materials relating to what constitutes a labor dispute, see Buchholz v. Cummins, 
6 Ill.2d 382, 128 N.E.2d 900 (1955); Albondi v. Board of Review, 8 N.J. Super. 71, 73 A.2d 
262 (App. Div. 1950); 49 COL. L. REv. 550 (1949). 
13. For a discussion of the "factory or establishment" clause, see Baker Unemployment 
Benefits in Labor Contraversies: The Anachronisms of the Establishment Doctrine. 16 
BUFFALO L. REv. 715 (1967). 
14. For materials relating to the treatment of participating in the labor dispute, see 
Armory Worsted Mills v. Riley, 96 N.H. 162,71 A.2d 788 (1950); Philadelphia Marine Trade 
Ass'n v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 202 Pa. Super. 149, 195 A.2d 138 
(1963); Williams, The Labor Dispute Disqualiftcation-A Primer and Some Problems. 8 VAN. 
L. REv. 338 (1955). 
15. See. e.g .• Outboard, Marine & Mfg. Co. v. Gordon, 403 Ill. 523, 87 N.E.2d 610 
(1949). 
16. See. e.g .• Westinghouse Elee. Corp. v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 
165 Pa. Super. 385, 68 A.2d 393 (1949). 
17. See. e.g .• Badgett v. Department of Indus. Relations, 243 Ala. 538, 10 So. 2d 880 
(1942). 
18. See generally Lewis, supra note 8. In 15 states strikers can receive unemployment 
compensation if state officials deem the employer in breach of a contract provision, or in 
violation of a federal or state law. 
19. U.S. SOCIAL SECURITY BOARD, DRAFT BILLS FOR STATE UNEMPLOYM~NT 
COMPENSATION OF POOLED FUND AND EMPLOYER RESERVE ACCOUNT TYPES § 2 (1936). 
20. For materials relating to this argument, see M. HUGHES, PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING 
LABOR-DISPUTE DISQUALIFICATION (1946); Lesser, Labor Disputes and Unemployment 
Compensation. 55 YALE L.J. 167 (1945); 37 NOTRE DAME LAW. 739 (1962); 56 Nw. U.L. 
REv. 662 (1961). 
352 WAYNE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16 
the government should remain neutral in economic disputes. The third 
general argument supporting labor dispute disqualification is a corollary of 
the neutrality policy21-the idea that it would be inequitable to finance 
strikes with funds derived from the employer.22 
An area in which the policies and provisions of the state labor dispute 
disqualification clauses have been intensely litigated is where the claimant 
stipulates that he was disqualified at one time from receiving benefits, but 
claims that his subsequent actiQns remove his ineligibility. Representative 
of this area are the so-called "stop-gap" cases, where an employee, after a 
strike at his principal place of employment, finds subsequent employment 
from which he is later laid off under conditions which would normally 
qualify him for compensation. In such cases, the courts are faced with 
conflicting equities. On one hand, the intermittent job can be a means to 
circumvent the statute.23 Contrariwise, inherent in the concept of 
unemployment insurance is the theory that an individual should be 
encouraged to find work.24 
To resolve these conflicting considerations, the courts have developed 
criteria to be applied in each case.25 The principal determinant is the intent 
of the employee at the time he accepted the subsequent jo b.26 Such factors 
as the type of work involved27 and the length of time employed2~ are 
frequently considered to determine whether the claimant accepted 
employment without any intention to return to the original job after the 
strike.29 
21. See, e.g., HUGHEs, supra note 20, at I; Lesser, supra note 20, at 175. 
22. The court in Huck v. Industrial Comm'n, 361 S.W.2d 332,336 (Mo. 1962), expressed 
the argument as follows: "It is only equitable that employers should not be taxed for 
unemployment benefits that would aid employees in a strike against the employers." 
23. See, e.g., Mark Hopkins, Inc. v. California Employment Comm'n., 24 Cal. 2d 744, 
151 P.2d 229 (1944); Bergan Point Iron Works v. Board of Review, 137 N.J.L. 685, 61 A.2d 
267 (Ct. Err. & App. 1948). 
24. See generally Harrison, Forenote: Statutory Purpose and "Involuntary 
Unemployment," 55 YALE L.J. 117, 119 (1945). "The concept of the involuntary character 
of the unemployment ... pegged by the condition ... that the worker ... must be available 
for work ... means that the worker must want employment, not unemployment and must 
signify his desire at the point where its authenticity may be put to a realistic test." (emphasis 
added). 
25. The leading case in this area is Mark Hopkins, Inc. v. California Employment 
Comm'n, 24 Cal. 2d 744, 151 P.2d 229 (1944). See also Ruberiod Co. v. California 
Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bel., 59 Cal. 2d 73, 378 P.2d 102,27 Cal. Rptr.878 (1963); Scott 
v. Smith, 141 Mont. 230, 376 P.2d 733 (1962). 
26. See, e.g., Brechner v. florida Indus. Comm'n, 148 So. 2d 567 (fla. 1963); Scott v. 
Smith, 141 Mont. 230, 376 P.2d 733 (1962); New Jersey Zinc Co. v. Board of Review, 25 
N.J. 235, 135 A.2d 496 (1957). 
27. The theory is that a worker who is seeking a permanent job will accept employment 
in a familiar field. See generally Huck v. Industrial Comm'n, 361 S. W.2d 332 (Mo. 1962). 
28. See, e.g., .Brechner v. florida Indus. Comm'n, 148 So. 2d 567 (fla. 1963). 
29. The test of intent seems to be SUbjective rather than objective. For example, the court 
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In applying this criteria, the courts reason in terms of the continuing 
relation between the first employer and employee.3o If the intermittent 
employment is a permanent, bona fide, full time job, the continuity is 
broken31 and the unemployment is not due to the labor dispute, but is the 
result of losing the later job. However, if the criteria does not apply 
favorably to the applicant, the subsequent job does not sever the 
relationship with the original employee,32 and the applicant is within the 
disqualification provision. 
The majority of the instant court visualized the facts as a stop-gap 
situation in which the employment at Pioneer was a temporary intermittent 
job.33 On this basis, it reached the decision that the Utah disqualification 
provision applied. It then concluded that it is irrelevant that the Pioneer 
job was acquired prior to the strike.3~ The court's sole justification was that 
a contrary holding would make it easy for an employee to take a job in 
anticipation of labor disputes and thereby circumvent the statute.35 
The court erred in treating the stop-gap criterion as controlling. This 
criteria presupposes a situation where the issue is whether or not the 
subsequent employment ends prior disqualification. In deciding if the 
second job is intended to be bona fide, permanent, and full time, the courts 
are determining the effect of the new job on the applicant's preexisting 
ineligibility. Otherwise, the concept of severance of the employer-employee 
relationship would have no meaning. Inherent in the concept of severance 
is the idea of an event occurring which breaks a chain of existing links. The 
reasoning in the stop-gap cases may be viewed as an exclusive "either/or" 
concept. Either the applicant is still an employee of his principal employer, 
or, by reason of a subsequent event, the employment is terminated. When 
in Bruley v. Rorida Indus. Comm'n, 101 So. 2d 22 (Ra. 1958), did not consider it important 
whether the employee actually returned to his first job after the strike. 
30. See, e.g., Ruberoid Co. v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 59 Cal. 2d 
73, 378 P.2d 102, 27 Cal. Rptr. 878 (1963); Mark Hopkins Inc. v. California Employment 
Comm'n, 24 Cal. 2d 744, 151 P.2d 229 (1944); Gentile v. Director of Div. of Employment 
Security, 329 Mass. 500, 109 N.E.2d 140 (1942); See generally Annot., 28 A.L.R.2d 287 
(1953). 
31. See. e.g .. Bergan Point Iron Works v. Board of Review, 137 N.J.L. 685, 61 A.2d 
267 (Ct. Err. & App. 1948). 
32. See. e.g .• McAllister v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 197 Pa. Super. 
552, 180 A.2d 121 (1962). 
33. Cruz v. Department of Employment Security, 22 Utah 2d 393, 453 P.2d 894, 895 
(1969): "[W]e can come to no other conclusion except had Cruz gone with the sand company 
after the strike such employment would not have made him eligible .... " 
34. [d. at 393, 453 P.2d at 895: "The circumstance of double employment at the time 
of the strike under the facts and concessions here, should not serve to transmute 
disqualification into qualification." 
35. The court fails to explain why it would be more difficult to determine the intent of 
taking a supplemental job before the strike than accepting one after the strike. 
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the courts speak of intent in the stop-gap cases, the assumption is that if 
the employee intends to return to his former job, he also intends to leave 
his second employment. This is implicit in the criterion of permanent full 
time employment. In the instant case the two jobs do not stand in the same 
relation. Whether the job at Pioneer removed a preexisting disqualification 
under the labor dispute provision is not at issue. Cruz was ineligible for 
benefits at the time Kennecott went on strike because he was gainfully 
employed.36 Further, the effect of the Pioneer job on the employer-employee 
relationship at Kennecott was the same both before and after the strike.37 
Thus, if the Pioneer job did not sever the employer-employee relationship 
before the strike, a fortiori, it could not have done so after the work 
stoppage. 
The factual distinctions between the typical stop-gap situation and the 
instant case demonstrate the logical inconsistency in denying Cruz benefits. 
The court in the principal case views the criterion of severance with the first 
employer as the determinant factor in receiving benefits from the second 
job. The problem with this approach is that the court extends its analogy 
further than necessary, thereby creating results inconsistent with the stop-
gap cases. While the courts in the stop-gap cases speak of severance, the 
underlying determinative is the permanency of the job for which benefits 
are sought. The result of their reasoning is that if the applicant's 
unemployment results from the loss of a permanent job, the existence of a 
strike does not disqualify him from benefits under the labor dispute 
provisions. The instant court misinterprets the stop-gap rationale. It views 
these cases as requiring severance as a necessary element of permanency. 
In other words, to be permanent, one job must have the function of severing 
the employer-employee relation at a different job. However, this reasoning 
is limited to the particular situation where the second job is taken after the 
strike. The courts in the stop-gap cases are not concluding that severance 
and permanency are necessarily inclusive concepts, but merely that in a 
limited situation they are codeterminate. In the principal case, the 
36. In many juristictions partial unemployment will bring the applicant within the general 
disqualification provision. See, e.g., Adelsman v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 267 ·Minn. 116, 
123, 125 N. W.2d 444,449 (1963), where the court stated: "To /bring the employees here within 
the statutory disqualification ... [It] must be established ... that the employee has left or 
partially or totally lost his employment .... " In Utah, since the job at Pioneer was full 
time, Cruz would not be deemed unemployed at the time of the strike at Kennecott. UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 35-4-22(m)(I) (1953) states: "An individual shall be deemed 'unemployed' •.. 
in any week of less than full time work if the wages payable to him with respect to such week 
are less than his weekly benefit amount." (emphasis added). 
37. Viewing the situation in terms of time, the Pioneer job is a constant. The only change 
or occuring event is his discharge from Pioneer, which can hardly be said to sever the 
employer-employee relationship at Kennecott. 
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permanency of the Pioneer job is stipulated. It follows that the logical result 
should be to allow Cruz benefits for loss of a permanent job at a time when 
he is receiving no income from any other job. 
A further problem in the case which the court failed to consider was 
that of causation. The statute provides, that for a claimant to be ineligible, 
it must be found, ''that his unemployment is due to a stoppage of work 
which exists because of a strike." The wording of the statute delineates two 
aspects of causation.3~ First, the stoppage of work must be caused by the 
strike. Second, the unemployment status must be caused by the stoppage 
of work.39 It is generally accepted that a "but-for"40 relationship satisfies 
the work stoppage requirement.41 However, the unemployment status of the 
applicant must be the direct or proximate result of the work stoppage.42 In 
the instant case only the former causation requirement is met, since only a 
"but-for" relation exists between the applicant's unemployed status and the 
work stoppage. While it can be said that Cruz would have been employed 
but for the strike at Kennecott, the strike did not bring a bout his 
unemployed status. Theoretcially, the same is true in the stop-gap line of 
cases relied on by the court. However, in stop-gap cases courts have taken 
the position that if the subsequent job does not satisfy the severance 
requirement, the causal connection between unemployment and work 
stoppage is not broken.43 In causation terms, the second job is said to be 
an insufficient intervening cause.44 
38. See, e.g., Fierst & Spector, Unemployment Compensation in Labor Disputes, 49 
YALE L.J. 461, 484 (1940); Shadur, Unemployment Benefits and the "Labor Dispute" 
Disqualification, 17 U. CHI. L. REv. 294, 315 (1950); Williams, supra note 14, at 344. 
39. See, e.g., Abramowitz, "Stoppage of Work due to a Labor Dispute" as Defined by 
the Unemployment Compensation Laws, 10 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 604, 619-20 (1942): 
Although it may be found that at a particular establishment there exists a stoppage 
of work, that a labor dispute exists, and that the stoppage of work is due to the labor 
dispute, it need not necessarily be concluded that the claimant's unemployment is 
caused by the stoppage of work .... If the claimant's unemployment ... is due to 
some intervening event he may not be disqualified. 
40. In other words, the work stoppage is due to the labor dispute only if it would not 
have existed but for that dispute. If a new factor appears later which would alone be sufficient 
to cause a stoppage of work, the labor dispute is no longer the sine qua non of the stoppage. 
41. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 14, at 344. 
42. See, e.g., Bunny's Waffle Shop, Inc. v. California Employment Comm'n, 24 Cal. 2d 
735, 151 P.2d 224 (1944); Mark Hopkins, Inc. v. California Employment Comm'n, 24 Cal. 
2d 744, 151 P.2d 229 (1944); Lewis, supra note 8, at 183. 
43. See, e.g., Brechner v. Florida Indus. Comm'n, 148 So. 2d 567 (Fla. 1963); Gentile 
v. Director of Div. of Employment Security, 329 Mass. 500, 109 N.E.2d 140 (1952); Huck v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 361 S. W. 2d 332 (Mo. 1962); McAllister v. Unemployment 
Compensation Bd. of Review, 197 Pa. Super. 552, 180 A.2d 121 (1962). 
44. See generally Mark Hopkins, Inc. v. California Employment Comm'n, 24 Cal. 2d 
744, 151 P.2d 229 (1944); Bergan Point Iron Works v. Board of Review, 137 N.J.L. 685, 62 
A.2d 267 (Cl. Err. & App. 1948). 
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The causation problem of the principal case can be analogized to the 
line of cases where an employee is laid off due to the lack of work, and 
subsequently, a labor dispute arises during the period of unemployment.l:; 
In such a situation, several jurisdictions have held that the labor dispute 
does not disqualify the applicant from unemployment benefits until work 
becomes available and the employee refuses the work because of the 
dispute.l6 In Jones and Laughlin Steel Co. v. Unemployment Compensation 
Board of Review,l7 the court stated that "where unemployment is due to 
lack of work, the mere occurrence of a labor dispute will not change the 
legal causation of unemployment. ... " However, in cases where the 
worker actively participates in the subsequent labor dispute some courts 
stretch the concept of proximate cause to disqualify the applicant.l~ Even 
in the situation of active participation, the courts, realizing the difficulty 
of establishing a direct causal link, rely in part upon the availability 
doctrine.49 As the court in Tucker v. American Smelting & Refining 
CompanyO said: "By ... doing 'picket duty' we think he thereby made 
himself unavailable for work ... and made his own strike and stoppage 
of work the direct and proximate cause of his own continued 
unemployment. "51 
While these cases are distinguishable from the principal case in that 
they only involve one job, the causation problem is similar. Unlike the stop-
gap situation where the doctrine of intervening cause was invoked,52 it 
cannot be said of the Tucker situation that the work stoppage has directly 
brought about the unemployment. Since there was no period of 
unemployment between jobs in the instant case, a direct relation between 
the unemployment and the labor dispute is similarly missing. Because the 
jobs were coexistent, there is by definition, no causal connection into which 
45. For a general treatment of this line of cases, see 52 CORNELL. L.Q.738 (1967). 
46. Under most state statutes an individual is disqualified from benefits if he does not 
make himself available for suitable employment or refuses to accept such a job. The state 
provisions vary on the determination of the meaning of suitable work and when the individual 
must accept a job. However, all the states, since federal standards require, prohibit denying 
benefits where the offered position is vacant due to a labor dispute. Further, denial of benefits 
is prohibited if, as a condition of employment, the individual would be forced to resign or 
refrain from joining any bona fide union, or accept wages substantially lower than the 
prevailing wage structure in the locality. 
47. 202 Pa. Super. 209, 214, 195 A.2d 922, 925 (1963). 
48. See, e.g., Tucker v. American Smelting & Refining Co., 189 Md. 250, 55 A.2d 692 
(1947); American Dredging Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 208 Pa. 
Super. 451,222 A.2d 449 (1966). 
49. For background material on the availability concept see, Freeman, Able to Work and 
Available for Work, 55 YALE L.J. 123 (1945); Williams, supra note 14. 
50. 189 Md. 250, 55 A.2d 692 (1947). 
51. [d. at 259, 55 A.2d at 696. 
52. See notes 38-45 supra and accompanying text. 
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the Pioneer job could intervene. Under the analogy with theTucker line of 
cases, Cruz would be eligible for unemployment benefits. This follows since 
Cruz, at least insofar as his availability to the labor marker is concerned, 
cannot be considered an active participant in the strike at Kennecott. The 
non-act of refusal to cross the picket line, while sufficient to bring him 
within the labor dispute disqualifying provision in respect to the Kennecott 
job, is not sufficient to transform the labor dispute work-stoppage into the 
direct cause of his unemployment. 
In addition to the court's misapplication of the labor dispute 
provision, the policy arguments against granting benefits do not apply. 
Since it is stipulated that the positions held at both Kennecott and Pioneer 
were good faith jobs, it does not appear that the neutrality notion is 
relevant.53 Cruz is applying for benefits as a result of his discharge from 
Pioneer, not Kennecott. Therefore, unless it is claimed, as in the stop-gap 
cases, that the second job was taken to circumvent the statute,54 it cannot 
be said that the state would be supporting either side in the Kennecott 
dispute. Likewise, since Cruz would be receiving remuneration based on his 
employment with Pioneer, it could not be argued that Kennecott would be 
subsidizing a strike by its own employees.55 The voluntary-involuntary 
policy has never been an absolute doctrine.56 The courts have deviated from 
the ordinary sense of volition to reach desired results. For example, an 
employee may be out of work by his own choice and still receive benefits 
due to the court's definition of lockout.57 The voluntary doctrine is also 
disregarded in some jurisdictions where the labor dispute is attributable to 
an employer's violation of some labor law,5s or where an employee has just 
cause for leaving his job."9 
Whatever the status of the voluntary argument under the labor dispute 
53. See notes 2-18 supra and accompanying text. 
54. See. e.g .• Huck v. Industrial Comm'n, 361 S.W.2d 332 (Mo. 1962). 
55. The amount of benefits would be based on Cruz's wage scale at Pioneer. 
56. For example, Congress prohibits disqualification where the individual refuses to 
return to work if the struck employer demands a "scab" or strike breaker agreement. 
57. See. e.g .• Lee Nat'l Corp. v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 206 Pa. 
Super. 96, 211 A.2d 124 (1965). 
58. UTAH CODE ANN. § 354-5(d)(l) (1953) provides: "[Ilf the commission, upon 
investigation, shall find that such strike is caused by the failure or refusal of any employer to 
conform to the provisions of any law of the state of Utah or of the United States pertaining 
to hours, wages, work, such strike shall work such strike shall not render the workers ineligible 
for benefits." Generally, however, the notion of governmental neutrality in labor disputes has 
caused states not to allow benefits where the employer is at fault. For a discussion of this 
topic, see Simrell, Employer Fault vs. General Wei/are as the Basis 0/ Unemployment 
Compensation. 55 YALE L.J. 181 (1945). 
59. See. e.g .• Wolfs v. Iowa Employment Security Comm'n, 244 Iowa 999, 59 N.W.2d 
216 (1953); Fannon v. Federal Cartridge Corp., 219 Minn. 306, 18 N. W.2d 249 (1945); 
Kempfer, Disqualification/or Voluntary Leaving and Misconduct. 55 YALE L.J. 147 (1945). 
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disqualification provision,60 its treatment has a twofold significance to the 
instant case. First, its treatment demonstrates that the argument is 
malleable in regard to the equities of the particular situation. The equities 
of the instant case weigh heavily against the majority opinion. As the 
dissent pbints out, the effect of denying Cruz benefits would be to penalize 
a worker for holding two jobs. This is demonstrated by assuming, in lieu 
of the actual facts, that the layoff at Pioneer occurred before the strike at 
Kennecott. On the basis of these facts, Cruz would be ineligible at the time 
of layoff from Pioneer since he would be still unemployed. He would also 
be disqualified after the strike at Kennecott by reason of his voluntary 
unemployment. On the other hand, a less industrious employee of Pioneer, 
who held only that job, would be eligible for benefits. Second, the reliance 
on the voluntary doctrine demonstrates that the emphasis in state 
unemployment compensation acts is on the worker's relation to past 
employersY This would indicate that the purpose of the acts in general is 
geared more to providing compensation for loss of a job, than providing 
benefits for failure to have a jo b. 62 This view is supported by both the 
background63 and mechanism of the acts.64 In the instant case, such a 
theory would favor the granting of benefits. If the emphasis were on the 
failure to have a job at the time of application, the continuance of the 
employer-employee relation at Kennecott would be a persuasive argument 
for not granting benefits. This follows from the fact that since workers on 
striKe are considered employed,65 it could be argued that Cruz had a job 
when he applied for benefits. However, since the emphasis is on losing a 
job, the discharge from Pioneer should be given greater consideration. The 
creation of the need for supplemental income arose from the applicant's 
discharge from his last employer,66 Pioneer, regardless of his employer-
employee relationship with Kennecott. 
The proper interpretation of compensation unemployment in situations 
presented by the principal case should be that if the applicant has 
60. The voluntary doctrine has also come under attack by some commentators. See, e.g., 
Harrison, supra note 24. See generally Fierst & Spector, supra note 38. 
61. See, e..g ... Harrison, supra note 24. 
62. [d. 
63. See, e.g., Reisenfeld, supra note 4, at 232: "The system protects only job seekers who 
are already and genuinely attached to the labor force and belong to covered occupations." 
64. All jurisdictions require that an individual must have earned a specific amount of 
wages or must have worked for a specific critical period preceding his claim. The amount of 
remuneration is in relation to this base period. 
65. See, e.g., Mark Hopkins, Inc. v. California Employment Comm'n, 24 Cal. 2d 744, 
151 P.2d 229 (1944). 
66. Such a ruling would not be in violation of the wording of the statute. Some 
juristictions have interpreted "last employed" strictly. See, e.g., Great Lakes Steel Corp. v. 
Michigan Employment Security Comm'n, 381 Mich. 249, 161 N.W.2d 14 (1968). 
